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THE "UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION"
AND THE U.C.C.
The idea of contract lurks in the background of constitutional
theory. Much of our theorizing about the Constitution ultimately
stems from Locke's social contract theory. It is also common to
contrast styles of constitutional interpretation with the judicial approach to other legal documents such as contracts. In fact, this
journal recently ran a symposium on "The Constitution as Hard
Law," devoted to just such comparisons. 1 These analogies to contract law usually assume that we all know how courts construe contracts. Yet few teachers of constitutional law also teach the
contracts course. Just how do courts interpret contracts? How is
contract law different from constitutional law?
These questions were brought to mind by a passage in a recent
piece about the originalism debate:
Indeed, if original ism were unsound, the legal system would be in trouble, since
it is essentially the method used for interpreting other legal instruments-statutes,
contracts, wills, treaties-which are interpreted in light of the understanding of
those who enacted or entered into them. Why this process should be thought im·
possible for the Constitution but natural and inevitable in every other area is something of a mystery2

If only, in other words, we would just approach the Constitution
the way we approach a contract ...
Well, O.K., let's try it. Suppose the Constitution were governed by the Uniform Commercial Code. How would it be
construed?
The common assumption seems to be that if the Constitution
were considered to be "hard law"-like a contract-courts would
decide all issues based solely on the ordinary meaning of the text
combined with the drafting history.J We wouldn't have any of this
nonsense about an "unwritten Constitution" or penumbras or
I. 6 CONST. CO!\o!M. !9 (1989).
2. McConnell, Book Review, 98 YALE L.J. ISOI, ISIS (!989). Although I will not
pursue the point here, McConnell may well be wrong about the role of originalism in statutory interpretation. See W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, LEGISL\TION: STATlJTES AND THE
CREATION OF Pt.:BLIC POLICY ch. 7 (1988).
3. These factors are of course important-indeed, often dominant-in contract interpretation, but they are not exclusive.
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nonenumerated rights. Let's take the "right to privacy." If the
Constitution were a contract, would it include a "right to privacy"?
If the role of the court is to interpret the contract, presumably
such a right would have to be in the document. At least, you might
think so. But the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) says otherwise. The role of the court is indeed to interpret "the contract," but
the contract isn't a written document. Section 1-201(10) defines
"contract" as "the total legal obligation which results from the parties' agreement as affected by this Act and any other applicable
rules of law." It then says "Compare 'Agreement'". "Agreement," in turn is defined in 1-201(3) as "the bargain of the parties in
fact as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of
performance as provided in this Act." So, we can find the right of
privacy in the "contract" even if it isn't in the document in either of
two ways: (1) it might be part of the U.C.C.'s background rules, or
(2) it might be implied by "other circumstances including course of
dealing or usage of trade or course of performance."
We might begin by asking whether a right to privacy was part
of the understanding of the parties at the time the agreement was
made. Admittedly, it isn't explicitly mentioned in the text. On the
other hand, we're not necessarily limited to the text. Under U.C.C.
§ 2-202, the writing can be supplemented "by evidence of consistent
additional terms unless the court finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of
the agreement." The Constitution doesn't contain an "integration
clause" explicitly eliminating any additional terms. On the contrary, the ninth amendment seems almost to be an explicit disclaimer of such exclusivity. Suppose you saw a contract term that
said: "The enumeration in [this contract] of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the [parties]."
Would you think the contract was intended to be a complete statement of the rights of the parties?4
There seems to be a good argument, then, that "additional
terms" are admissible to supplement the constitutional text. Section 2-202 also allows the admission of trade usage. A trade usage
is defined as "any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an
expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction
4. For an extensive historical argument that the Constitution was not intended to be a
complete statement of constitutional rights. see Sherry. The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1987). The privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment provides additional textual support for this thesis.
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in question." Was government respect for the "right to privacy"
such a practice in 1789 when the Constitution was adopted? (Or in
1866 when the fourteenth amendment was adopted?) It's hard to
know without detailed historical research, but governments may
well have respected some sort of right to privacy with sufficient regularity "to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question"-which is to say, in future
governmental acts.
The Code's basic interpretative philosophy is stated in the
comment 1 to section 1-205:
[T]he meaning of the agreement of the parties is to be determined by the language
used by them and by their action, read and interpreted in the light of commercial
practices and other surrounding circumstances. The measure and background for
interpretation are set by the commercial context, which may explain and supplement even the language of a formal or final writing.

Comment 4 points out that usages of trade "furnish the background
and give particular meaning to the language used, and are the
framework of common understanding" underlying the contract.
Thus, we need to ask whether there was a "common understanding" in 1789 about aspects of privacy. Although the boundaries of
that common understanding may be unclear, it does seem reasonable to assume that the framers took for granted the concept of limited government. In giving the federal government the power to
govern the District of Columbia, for example, the framers probably
did not believe that they were granting despotic authority over the
residents (even though the Bill of Rights did not yet exist). Rather,
they probably had in mind commonly accepted limitations on
government.
So far, we have been considering the problem of construing the
Constitution at the time of adoption. What of the "living Constitution" idea? The U.C.C. certainly leaves room to consider postadoption events in interpreting the Constitution. Under 2-208, the
"course of performance" under the contract is always relevant to
interpreting the agreement, on the theory that the "parties themselves know best what they have meant by their words of agreement
and their action and that agreement is the best indication of what
that meaning was." Thus, later history would bear on the interpretation of the Constitution's ambiguous clauses.
"Course of performance" can also modify the terms of the contract itself, as 2-208(3) makes clear. The Article V amendment process specifies a particular avenue for modifying the Constitution.
Akhil Amar has recently argued that this method of modification
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was not intended to be exclusive.s Even if it was, course of performance can still affect the rights of the parties. The closest analogue
under the U.C.C. is the common use of contract provisions requiring that all modifications of the contract be in writing. The U.C.C.,
unlike the common law, gives legal effect to these provisions. But
the modification can still be effective as a waiver and cannot be retracted if "retraction would be unjust in view of a material change
of position in reliance on the waiver." (U.C.C. § 2-209(3)).
Thus, the U.C.C. leaves some room for new terms to enter the
Constitution informally, even if the amendment process was intended to be the exclusive method of modification. For example,
consider the expansion of federal power under the commerce clause.
Even if the current scope of federal power were found to be inconsistent with the clause itself, the current "course of performance"
could operate as a waiver of the limits of the commerce clause-and
if so, there certainly seems to be enough reliance to make retraction
"unjust in view of a material change of position."
So far, we have been considering what the U.C.C. calls the
"agreement" of the parties, as opposed to the "contract," which includes terms implied by law. The U.C.C. provides some additional
contract terms beyond those specifically intended by the parties.
The most important is the "warranty of merchantability." If we
consider the government to be something like a "seller" of laws,
then section 3-314 implies a warranty that those laws be "merchantable." Disclaimers of this warranty are tightly controlled by § 2316-for example, the word "merchantable" must be used and the
disclaimer must be conspicuous, or else special terms like "sold as
is" must be used. The Constitution doesn't contain any language of
this type. So, the implied warranty does apply.
What does it mean to be merchantable? Among other things,
the goods have to be "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such
goods are used." U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(d). As applied to a law, this
seems to require that the law be "fit for the ordinary purposes for
which laws are passed"-that is, that the law be reasonably related
to some accepted government purpose. If the government supplies
a law that doesn't meet this test, that's a breach of warranty. Precisely how to apply this test is a bit unclear, but it seems plausible to
say that the contraceptive law in Griswold failed the test. If I had
ordered reasonable legislation and were shipped the Connecticut
contraceptive law, I'd send it back to the seller with a nasty note.
The warranty of merchantability, like the written terms of the
5. Amar, Philadelphia Revised: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1043 (1988).
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contract, is within the control of the parties. But the Code also
imposes a mandatory, non-disclaimable obligation that might have
some interesting implications for constitutional law. Under § 1203, "[e]very contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation
of good faith in its performance or enforcement." The comment
describes this as "a basic principle running throughout this Act."
Good faith is defined generally in§ 1-201(19) as "honesty in fact,"
but in sales transactions it carries a special meaning. Under 2201(1)(b), good faith in the case of a merchant also includes "the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in
the trade." By analogy, the government might be required to comply with "reasonable democratic standards of fair dealing in government." Surely, this is more than enough of a basis for a right to
abortion under at least some circumstances, such as cases of rape or
incest, or where the woman's health is threatened. This argument
might or might not take us all the way to Roe v. Wade, but it does
go well beyond the originalist position on abortion.
What are we to make of all this? At the very least, people
ought to be more careful about making hasty analogies between
constitutional law and the supposedly more limited methods of interpretation used in contracts and other private law subjects.6 But
in fact, the U.C.C. may even have some genuine relevance to constitutional law. The idea of consent plays a major role in both constitutional law and contracts. As the U.C.C. illustrates, courts no
longer view the "understanding of the parties" as being solely embodied in a written text. Rather, they look at the text as being set in
a whole matrix of common understandings, some limited to the parties or their trade, others representing broad social norms of good
faith. To use some of the lingo of the contracts trade, we may need
to think of the Constitution as more of a "relational" contract. Or,
to put it another way, the U.C.C. suggests that we may have not
only an unwritten Constitution but also an unwritten social
contract.
One counter to the U.C.C. analogy is to point out that the
courts can permissibly exercise a greater policymaking role in the
contract area, because the legislature can always overrule their
judgment. There is obviously something to this argument, but I
wonder if it is quite as powerful as it appears. The legislature can
change the court's policy judgment prospectively, but for the particular parties to any individual contract, the court's word is almost
certain to be final in interpreting their rights and duties. Indeed, the
6. Lest you dismiss the U C.C. as a legislative intrusion on contracting, you should
know that the Second Restatement of Contracts tracks it closely.
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contract clause may constitutionally preclude the legislature from
modifying judicial interpretations retroactively. As to any contract
already in existence, the judiciary's word is nearly as final as it is in
constitutional matters.
More importantly, this argument misses much of the point of
the U.C.C. provisions by viewing them as intruding on the autonomy of the parties. The philosophy of the U.C.C., however, is that
the court is upholding rather than restricting the true agreement of
the parties-but the U.C.C. views that agreement as including a lot
of tacit understandings. Similarly, the real understanding between
"We, the People" and the government may be broader than the
terms in the document that now resides in the national archives. Or
perhaps this is pushing the metaphor of the social contract too far.
At first blush, the idea of applying the U.C.C. to the Constitution seems peculiar. Of course, no one would argue that the U.C.C.
has the force of law as applied to the Constitution-how could a
mere statute trump the Constitution? But the Constitution does not
contain a set of interpretative rules, so we must inevitably look elsewhere for our "meta-constitutional" rules of interpretation. Today,
it is fashionable among scholars to look to French literary critics
and German philosophers for such guidance. It seems at least
equally reasonable, however, to look for guidance to the rules that
govern the application of other important legal documents. 7
One important difference between constitutional interpretation
and contract law is that courts have the power to declare contracts
invalid, but not the power to set aside constitutional provisions.
What we are concerned with here, however, are not the rare cases in
which courts set aside contracts, but the much more common cases
in which they are called upon to construe them.
There is admittedly a disparity between the grandeur of the
Constitution and the commonplace consumer contract. Constitutional law involves weighty matters of public policy, while contract
law usually involves economic matters. To a great extent, however,
the difference between the areas is only one of scale: contract law is
constitutional law "writ small." What the two areas of law have in
common is a deep concern with issues of autonomy and consent.
The idea of democratic self-rule deservedly carries great weight in
constitutional cases, but freedom of contract exerts great force in
the smaller arena of contract law. Contract cases place great weight
7. Some readers have also suggested that the Supreme Court cannot apply ''outside
rules·· to the Constitution because the Court gets its authority from the Constitution itself.
An arbitrator gets his authority from the contract. however. but can still apply the U.C.C. in
contract disputes.
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on party autonomy, just as the Supreme Court often stresses the
importance of democratic self-rule. At this fundamental level, the
parallelism is strong.
Democratic self-rule is, if anything, a more complex exercise of
autonomy than contractual autonomy. The lesson of the U.C.C. is
that even in the contract arena, the exercise of autonomy is a complex matter that extends beyond the time and place of signing a
document. It seems unlikely that creating a constitutional regime is
a more straightforward task than the sale of goods. Contracts are
not made in a day; neither was the Constitution.
While there are differences between constitutional adjudication
and routine contract cases, at least some of these differences cut
against originalism. Courts are rarely called upon to construe contracts that are two hundred years old, signed and ratified by hundreds of individuals, and then amended by hundreds more decades
later. If faithful attention to text and drafting history do not always
suffice in ordinary contract cases, they seem even less adequate in
constitutional cases.
The U.C.C. does provide important flexibility in contract cases,
but it would be a mistake to suggest that "anything goes" in contract cases (let alone in constitutional cases). In routine cases, contract language (and to a lesser extent the drafting and context of the
agreement) are usually decisive. Courts are cautious in their use of
the flexible instruments provided by the U.C.C., in part because of
concern that excessive judicial discretion in contract cases would
undermine legal certainty and risk substituting the court's preferences for those of the parties. Similar concerns clearly are entitled
to weight in constitutional law. In neither area, however, have the
courts confined themselves to a strict originalism.
One reason for the tenacity with which some people equate the
"meaning" of the Constitution and the "original intent" may be a
belief that originalism is the norm elsewhere in the law. If nothing
else, a study of contract law is helpful in dispelling this illusion. In
the leading contemporary treatise on contract law, Professor Farnsworth defines interpretation as "the process by which a court ascertains the meaning that it will give to the language used by the
parties in determining the legal effect of toe contract." He
continues:
The word interpretation has not always been used in this sense. Some writers
have used it more narrowly to refer to the process by which a court determines the
meaning that the parties themselves attached to their language. Although their
meaning is influential in determining the meaning that a court will give to their
language. it is not necessarily controlling because a court may take account of fac-
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tors that are unrelated to the parties' intentions8

In short, originalism does not reign in contract law. Perhaps it
shouldn't be surprising that it doesn't reign in constitutional law
either.
D.A.F.

8.

E.

FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS

477 (1982).

